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RECONSECRATING AMERICA. By George Goldberg.' 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Com-
pany. 1984. Pp. 145. $9.95. 
Ruti G. Teite/2 
A creche side by side with a menorah, funded by city taxes and 
erected in city hall, prayers (at least Christian and Jewish) before 
morning classes in our public schools, tuition tax credits and direct 
payments to parochial schools and perhaps even churches-non-
discriminatory religion worked into our woefully secularized public 
life, and approved by our Supreme Court. This is the proposal of 
George Goldberg's Reconsecrating America. One of the more read-
able of a recent crop of books denouncing the weakened state of 
religion in our public life,J Reconsecrating America is an anecdotal 
layman's casebook of the past forty years of Supreme Court analy-
sis. While always entertaining, it unintentionally supports the very 
separationist theories it sets out to demolish. 
I 
According to Goldberg, the Court's basic error, committed 
some forty years ago, was to stray from the historical meaning of 
the religion clauses. The Constitution, read literally, only bars es-
tablishment by Congress, but Goldberg concedes that in our time 
any establishment theory applicable to Congress will extend to the 
states. In other respects, however, he continues to rely on his ver-
sion of the original understanding. The establishment clause, he as-
serts, was not meant to ban government aid to religion in general. 
Instead, it prohibited only preferential aid to a particular religion or 
religions. So long as religions are treated equally, government 
assistance is not only permissible but desirable, because it promotes 
the values enshrined in the free exercise clause. The protection of 
free exercise means that "every person should be allowed, and 
wherever possible helped, to worship whatever it is he deems sacred 
.... "4 More concretely, Goldberg supports aid to parochial 
schools, Nativity displays, and prayers in the schools. Since his sole 
I. Author, lecturer, and member of the bars of the State of New York, the District of 
Columbia, and the United States Supreme Court . 
. 2. Assistant Director, National Legal Affairs Department, Anti-Defamation League; 
Adjunct Professor, Cardozo School of Law. 
3. Eg., R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA (1984); C. THOMAS, BooK BURNING (1983). 
4. G. GOLDBERG, RECONSECRATING AMERICA 114 (1984). 
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concern is equal treatment, one supposes that he might even accept 
federally funded churches. 
This theory invites discussion on two levels: first as history, 
and second as public policy. Goldberg's history is at best questiona-
ble. For example, there is no reference to "non-preferential" or 
"equal" in article IV of the Constitution. It would seem to bar any 
and all religious oaths or tests for federal office--even were every-
one to pick his or her own denomination. Similarly, the framers 
were against tax support for churches, whether universal or not. 
The history of disestablishment in Virginia is illustrative. In order 
to prevent disestablishment, the Anglicans proposed an assessment, 
with the revenues to be distributed among all the various Christian 
churches. Yet the Baptists and Presbyterians, helped by "nominal 
Anglicans" such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, opposed 
this proposal. s 
Their reasons for opposing aid to religion remain valid today. 
If the state is to give money to all religions, it must establish an 
official definition of "religion." With definition there is an attendant 
loss of religious freedom: unless you satisfy the state's criteria, you 
aren't eligible for the state's assistance. Obviously, this will not be a 
problem for the major religions; any official definition will encom-
pass them. It will affect only the small, powerless groups. 
Goldberg's insensitivity to their problems (he calls them "fringe") is 
evident throughout the book. 
The Goldberg "equal treatment" view of establishment even 
extends to school prayers. For Goldberg, McCollum v. Board of 
Education6 was decided incorrectly. McCollum was the landmark 
decision in which the Court held unconstitutional the practice of 
having outside instructors teach a variety of different religions in 
the schools. Unbelievably, Goldberg compares the public schools to 
public parks and finds it contradictory that the Court would bar 
prayers on one piece of tax-supported property and not on another.7 
The comparison of the public schools to public parks reflects 
an insensitivity to problems of church-state entanglement and a 
strange notion of voluntarism. The McCollum Court was more re-
alistic. It saw that the compulsory school attendance laws are 
designed to serve the governmental purpose of education for citizen-
ship. The Court found it improper for this machinery to be used to 
5. Derr, The First Amendment As a Guide to Church-State Relations, in CHURCH, 
STATE, AND POLmCS: FINAL REPORT Of THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CoNFER-
ENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (J. Hensel ed. 1981). 
6. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (disallowing multidenominational religion instructors from 
teaching on public school premises). 
7. G. GoLDBERG, supra note 4, at 54. 
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gather a captive audience for religious study. This compulsory at-
tendance, coupled with the inevitable role of teachers in supervising 
religious activities conducted on school premises during the normal 
school day, make for a most dubious sort of voluntarism. Such 
state involvement is utterly absent in the public parks, which are 
dedicated by government to free individual expression, without in-
structional overtones, and of course without mandatory attendance. 
Aside from these differences in government involvement, what 
about the obvious difference between children and adults? In case 
after case, the Justices have considered voluntarism to be especially 
unattainable where young and impressionable children are in-
volved.s Accordingly, in sustaining public prayer in legislative and 
university settings, the Court has been very careful to distinguish 
the public schools. 9 
To Goldberg, the child who experiences coercion when there is 
organized prayer in the schools is an odd fellow who should not be 
permitted to bestill the prayers of others. For in so doing he may be 
vetoing some parents' wishes to have prayer in the schools and thus 
violating Goldberg's "help religion wherever possible" doctrine. He 
glosses over the harm to the child and the parents who do not want 
the state to force them to witness or hear prayers. Their problem is 
solved, Goldberg believes, by offering them their own opportunity 
to pray. But what of those who do not pray? What of atheists and 
agnostics? Goldberg pays lip service to equal treatment: 
With tolerance for the beliefs and practices of others, however foolish they may seem, 
and enlisting the aid of the courts not to prevent others from doing what they want 
but only to enforce one's own right to equal time, the issue of prayers in public 
school can be resolved without amending the Constitution.IO 
Yes, the Goldberg equality test will protect you-no matter 
how foolish your beliefs-just as long as you believe. He roundly 
declares: "The idea . . . that agnosticism and even atheism must be 
8. See, e.g., Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (disallowing teacher-led Bible 
reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (disallowing state-prescribed prayer); McCol-
lum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (disallowing religion instructors from teaching on 
public school premises). See Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981) (disallowing 
voluntary student prayer), affd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982). 
9. See, e.g .• Marsh v. Chambers,- U.S.-, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3335-36 (1983) (uphold-
ing state legislative chaplaincy while distinguishing adults in the legislature "presumably not 
readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination' " or "peer pressure" from children in the pub-
lic schools); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.l4 (1981) (upholding student worship 
clubs in public university while describing university students as "young adults" who are 
older and "less impressionable" than younger students). See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672 (I 971) (upholding federal construction grants to church-related institutions, because 
university, unlike public school students, would be able to distinguish between the school's 
secular and religious purposes). 
10. G. GoLDBERG, supra note 4, at 122 (emphasis added). 
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given equal constitutional billing with traditional religion, is simply 
false."'' There is no equality for those who do not believe in a 
traditional religion, who are offended by religious practices in the 
schools, and who bring bothersome lawsuits. 
II 
Goldberg's constitutional views are, as we have seen, largely 
based on disdain for the interests of minority religions. The same 
disdain underlies his views about the adjudicatory process. He 
blames litigation by religious minorities for the modern evolution of 
church-state doctrine. 
Because religious minorities have tended to lose where govern-
ment was intermingled with religion, they have been able to con-
vince the Court not to allow aid for any religion. Indeed, "fringe" 
religious minorities have had so much clout with the Court, says 
Goldberg, that the only exceptions to the rule against government 
aid to religion-ostensibly on the ground of free exercise-have 
been made on their behalf. Similarly, free exercise is interpreted in 
an unduly narrow way, so as to protect only the religious 
minorities. 
Goldberg sees fit to inform us that many of the early free exer-
cise cases were brought by Jehovah's Witnesses, a group that he 
affectionately deems to be "fringe." The Amish and Seventh Day 
Adventists also qualify. Jews are "fringe" enough to win and just as 
often "traditional" enough to lose.12 In his analysis of McCollum, 
Goldberg takes us back two generations-to discover that the plain-
tiff's father was so antireligious that he wrote a book in which he 
called religious worship a disease. We have acquired more evidence 
that the acorn does not fall far from the tree, but we have learned 
little else. 
The main function of the Bill of Rights is to protect individual 
and minority rights. We therefore should be neither surprised nor 
indignant that church-state litigation is initiated by religious 
minorities. 
Again, Goldberg's history is as dubious as his policy. Con-
sider, for instance, the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,l3 in which the 
Court held that the Amish may not be forced to attend senior high 
11. /d. at 118 (emphasis added). 
12. Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (successful challenge to teacher-led 
school prayer), with McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (unsuccessful chal-
lenge to state blue laws). 
13. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding free exercise right for Amish children to learn at 
home rather than in the public schools after the eighth grade). 
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school. Goldberg finds the Court's solicitude for the desire of the 
Amish to practice their religion inconsistent with its refusal to sanc-
tion school prayers. Yoder was decided the way it was, Goldberg 
believes, because the plaintiffs were Amish, and the Court cannot 
seem to resist "fringe" religions. He offers a similar explanation of 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 14 recognizing a free exercise right to solicit 
religious contributions; West Virginia v. Barnette, 1s upholding a 
right not to salute the flag; and Sherbert v. Verner,16 sustaining un-
employment benefits for Sabbatarians. 
In fact, the Court's free exercise decisions are not adequately 
explained by Goldberg's theory. Sometimes, embarrassingly, Jeho-
vah's Witnesses lose-and Goldberg doesn't mention these cases. 
For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts,l7 where the state had an 
important policy against child labor, this interest overrode the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses' desire to have their children spend their days 
preaching. Without this weighing of religious liberty and other pol-
icy interests, how else are we to reconcile Prince and Yoder? Be-
cause Goldberg's own approach to religious freedom leaves no 
room for balancing competing interests, he is unable to understand 
what the Court has done. 
III 
The inadequacy of Goldberg's analysis is starkly revealed by 
Lynch v. Donnelly,'s the recent Nativity scene case. In Lynch, the 
Solicitor General's amicus brief tied the constitutionality of the 
creche to the nation's hundred-year tradition of celebrating Christ-
mas as a national holiday.'9 The Court agreed. In sustaining mu-
nicipal sponsorship of a creche, the opinion declared in effect that 
"you can't take the creche out of Christmas." The Court's syllogis-
tic reasoning ran something like this: if Christmas is a national hol-
iday, then it is not "religious," but rather is "cultural," and 
therefore constitutional. If "you can't take the creche out of Christ-
mas," and Christmas is constitutional, it follows that the creche, 
too, is constitutional. 
14. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
15. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (declaring right of students not to salute flag). 
16. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding unconstitutional application of state unemployment 
compensation provisions denying benefits to Jehovah's Witnesses who could not work on the 
Sabbath). 
17. 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding child labor laws despite Jehovah's Witness's claim 
of religious duty to work). 
18. -U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (upholding constitutionality of city owned and 
erected Nativity scene display). 
19. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). 
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This was the Court's attempt to shoehorn the creche into an 
enshrined American tradition, notwithstanding that the creche had 
no history of governmental display in the United States, unlike the 
Christmas tree which seasonally resides in the White House. The 
creche is undeniably a religious symbol which celebrates only one 
religion's Messiah-again unlike the tree, which is arguably secular. 
Hence public funding of a creche is not merely government promo-
tion of religion; it discriminatorily promotes only one religion. This 
preference for Christianity is inherent in the Court's reliance on the 
creche's linkage to Christmas as a national or "cultural" holiday, 
for other religious symbols are not similarly linked to national 
holidays. 
But Lynch does not faze Goldberg. "To me, a Jew living in a 
country where almost everybody else is Christian, there is only one 
religious issue: equal treatment."2o As long as Lynch is applied 
non-discriminatorily, it passes Goldberg's test. "If a creche is dis-
played during the Christmas season on the lawn of the public li-
brary, I want to see a menorah nearby."21 
The creche-menorah proposal nicely illustrates the invidious 
distinctions that are inevitably made by governments that support 
religion. As his comments on the menorah imply, Goldberg doesn't 
regard Judaism as an obstreperous minority religion. While other 
religious minorities are deemed "fringe" as they endeavor to "ma-
nipulate"22 the constitutional rights of others, Jews, though also a 
minority, are considered to be "traditional." To some, a creche 
alone is fine, because "we are a Christian nation." To Goldberg, 
one gathers, we are a "Christian-Jewish nation," and therefore a 
menorah must be added. 
Does Goldberg think the same amount of funding and space 
should be given to all religions? That might be unfair to the major-
ity. Perhaps instead the government aid should be allotted on a per 
capita basis, with more going to the major religions than to the mi-
nor ones. This would afford "comparable" prominence, perhaps, 
though not equality. Yet this approach is hardly preferable, for it 
would require considerable government inquiry into the religious 
beliefs of the citizenry, and for little apparent purpose. 
This sort of equality of governmental support between majority 
and minority religions has not heretofore been and should not now 
20. G. GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at xiii. 
21. Jd at xiv. See Kristol, The Political Dilemma of American Jews, CoMMENTARY, 
July 1984, at 23, 25. But see Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Recon-
ciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITI. L. REV. 673, 689 (1980). 
22. G. GoLDBERG, supra note 4, at xiv. 
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become our objective. Equality is easiest to achieve not by equal 
assistance, whatever that may mean, but by not assisting religion at 
all. It is this equality in each religion's relationship with govern-
ment which enables our religions-both majority and minority, of 
differing sizes, wealth and membership--to confront each other as 
equals. The equality among our religions fostered by the separa-
tionist principle has nurtured religious pluralism. 
At this writing, there are more than 1200 religions and sects in 
the United States.23 With this new and ever-growing religious di-
versity,24 a moral consensus is more elusive than ever. For 
Goldberg and others, this stands as an indictment oftoday's society. 
Yet the diversity would seem to stand for an altogether different 
message. As Madison found, it is evidence of America's ever-grow-
ing religious freedom2s-a freedom that requires independence 
from government. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION: By Kenneth F. Rip-
ple.! Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company. 1984. Pp. 
xxii, 674. $50.00. 
Brian K. Landsberg 2 
Constitutional law, perhaps more than any other body of law, 
has long been the preserve of the legal theorist. If "the lot of the 
constitutional theorist is not easy,"3 the lot of the lawyer who must 
merge theory and practice to litigate a constitutional case is even 
more difficult. 
Ripple attempts to improve the lot of the litigator facing his 
first foray into a realm which intimidates even veterans. Ripple's 
treatise is, to my knowledge, the first effort to create a constitutional 
law practitioner's primer. It must, however, compete with more en-
compassing treatises which between them cover most of the same 
23. J. MELTON, A DIRECTORY OF RELIGIOUS BoDIES IN THE UNITED STATES xiii 
(1977). 
24. See Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (comparing a relatively homo-
geneous religious composition during the time of the Founders with its evolving modern 
diversity). 
25. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351·52 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
I. Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
2. Visiting Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. 
Chief, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice; on leave 
1984-85. The Department, of course, bears no responsibility for what is said here. 
3. Auerbach, Book Review, I CoNST. COMM. 137, 163 (1984). 
